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Abstract 
 
Statutory tax rates of a country do not reflect a country’s true tax competitiveness, we propose 
and show that government debt to GDP ratio (GOVDEBT) of a country is a better proxy for 
its tax competitiveness. Using a comprehensive sample of 1,884 completed cross-border 
acquisition transactions from the U.S. to other OECD countries, we document that the U.S.-
target country GOVDEBT difference is significantly and positively related to both deal 
announcement return and post-deal tax saving of the acquirer. The GOVDEBT difference is 
also significantly and positively related to U.S.-target country deal flow. The findings remain 
robust when we control for the potential endogeneity of GOVDEBT difference. Our findings 
strongly suggest that tax avoidance is an important driver of U.S.-OECD cross-border deal 
flow and it increases shareholder wealth for U.S. acquirers.      
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“It’s a rock-solid fact that the U.S. corporate statutory tax rate is the highest among 
developed nations and is significantly higher than the average. …… There is, however, an 
unsettled debate over whether and by how much the U.S. corporate effective tax rate is higher 
than effective tax rates outside the United States. Effective tax rates seek to measure how 
much businesses really pay after all deductions and credits are considered.” 
-- Martin Sullivan, Forbes  
 
1. Introduction 
It is well known that statutory corporate tax rates of a country do not capture its true 
tax competitiveness since the nominal statutory rates do not reflect various time-varying tax 
breaks, deductions, exemptions, and credits offered by a country’s tax authorities. For 
example, Germany and Luxemburg have almost the same statutory corporate income tax rate 
(Germany 30.2% and Luxemburg 29.2%) in 2013. Nevertheless, Luxemburg’s effective 
corporate income tax rate is much lower than that of Germany as a result of the former’s 
numerous tax exemptions, deductions and credits [Mintz, and Chen 2014]. In fact, 
Luxemburg is often considered a tax haven by international investors. Besides corporate 
income tax, shareholders face many other types of taxes such as taxes on dividends and 
capital gains, general sales tax, property tax, transaction stamp tax, and so on.1 Thus, it is very 
difficult, if not impossible, for researchers, media reporters and policy makers to know the 
effective total tax burdens on firms operated in different countries.  
This issue is further complicated by the fact that firms in different countries have very 
different tax disclosure practices, which significantly reduces data comparability across 
countries. In fact, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project intends to promote common disclosure rules 
to give tax authorities early access to information on aggressive tax arrangements. 
In this paper, we study whether differences in cross-country tax competitiveness drive 
U.S. outbound M&A acquisitions. We focus on U.S. outbound deals as the U.S. tax system is 
regarded as one of the least competitive system within the 34 OECD countries. Starting from 
2014, Tax Foundation provides tax competitiveness scores for all OECD countries based on 
over 40 tax policy variables, including corporate income taxes, individual income and payroll 
taxes, consumption taxes, property taxes, and the treatment of foreign earnings. The U.S. ends 
up placing 32nd among the 34 industrialized nations, ranking near the bottom for tax 																																																								
1 For example, the Netherlands allows firms to reduce taxes on dividends and capital gains from subsidiaries and 
has a wide range of treaties that reduce taxes GRAVELLE, J. G. “Tax Havens: International Tax Avoidance and 
Evasion.” Congressional Research Service (2015).. 
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competitiveness in 2014 and 2015 [Erb 2014, Pomerleau, and Cole 2015, Pomerleau, and 
Lundeen 2014].  
Furthermore, the U.S. tax system has two competitive disadvantages compared to the 
tax systems of other OECD countries. First, it has the highest combined income tax rate (39% 
in 2015) in the OECD. Second, it has a worldwide tax system that taxes income of U.S. 
headquartered firms that is earned both in the U.S. and abroad.2 The income tax owed on 
earnings abroad can be deferred until it is repatriated by bringing it back to the U.S.. When 
earnings are repatriated, the U.S. tax law allows a foreign tax credit to alleviate concerns of 
double taxation. A firm can reduce its amount of U.S. tax by the amount already taxed by a 
foreign country [Barrasso 2012, Matheson et al. 2013].3 Second, in contrast to the U.S., 26 
OECD countries have territorial tax systems. Under such a system, the U.S. would tax only 
the income earned in the U.S. and exempt most of the income earned abroad.4 
 We propose to use a country’s government debt to GDP ratio (GOVDEBT) as a proxy 
for its true tax competitiveness. We argue that high levels of government debt are negatively 
associated with a country’s tax competiveness.  
Spending cuts and tax increases are two of the major debt reducing policy options 
available to governments when dealing with rising debt. Cutting spending can be tolerable 
when targeting programs and expenditures that do not damage economic growth and 
productivity severely such as unemployment benefits, military spending or government 
bureaucracies [IMF 1996]. However, reducing spending has its limits. Cutting federal funds 
in key areas such as research and development and infrastructure harms future productivity 
since the private sector won’t step up if the government withdraws its investment.  
Raising taxes, trimming tax credits and exemptions and hence increasing the effective 
tax burden is another option to reduce government debt. Former chairwoman of the Council 
of Economic Advisers, Christina Romer, states in a New York Times essay: “[…] nearly 
every economist I know agrees that the best way to raise (government) revenue would be limit 
tax breaks for households and corporations.” Romer [2011] further argues that tax increases 
would be less harmful to the economy then a spending cut as government spending helps 
improve future productivity. A tax increase by 1 percent of the nation’s economic output 																																																								
2 The U.K. (21% in 2014) and Ireland (12.5% in 2014) for example have the lowest combined income tax rates 
in the OECD. 3	“Example: A corporation in the 35 percent tax bracket repatriates $1 million of income earned abroad, it would 
owe $350,000 in U.S. tax. But it has already paid $200,000 in tax to the country where the income was earned at 
that country's 20 percent rate. It would owe the U.S. government another 15 percent ($150,000) in order to bring 
the total tax paid on the $1 million of income to the U.S. 35 percent tax rate.” [Barrosso 2012]. This would result 
in the firm paying the same amount in total taxes as it would if it earned the income in the U.S.	4	Seven	OECD	nations	have	a	worldwide	tax	system:	Chile,	Greece,	Ireland,	Korea,	Mexico,	Poland	and	the	U.S.	(Matheson	et	al.	2013).	
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would reduce GDP by the same percentage after 18 months. However, a spending cut by 1 
percent would reduce GDP by 1.5 percent. Thus, governments should reduce debt by raising 
taxes rather than through spending cuts.  
Romer, and Romer [2010] find that deficit reduction packages in the U.S. between the 
1980s and 1990s such as the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Tax Act of 1982 or the 
Onmibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 were accompanied with spending cuts that are 
generally small relative to the tax increases. The latter is associated with few adverse 
consequences and known as one of the most successful deficit reduction reform. The authors’ 
main results show that deficit-driven tax increases have little negative impact on output.  
Recent developments in Greece, Brazil and the United States show that tax increases 
are one of the major policy actions, if not the most important one, to reduce high levels of 
government debt. In 2016, Greece passed among other things, key tax hikes in exchange for 
much-needed bailout loans and debt relief. Tax changes include an increase in value-added 
tax by one point to 24 percent, an extension of the existing tax on real estate and a raise in 
duty on fuel and tobacco [Reuters 2016]. In 2015, Brazilian lawmakers reduced tax subsidies 
for the chemical industry, cut refunds to exporters of manufactured goods and raised the 
capital gains tax to up to 30% to deal with its exploding debt-to-GDP ratio of 67 percent 
[Guardian 2015, Levin, and Xie 2016].  
Former chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, Edward P. Lazear, forecasts 
major tax increases in the United States to deal with the $14 trillion in public debt. 
Historically, higher taxes were often the consequences following a high level of debt-to-GDP 
ratio and successful tools to deal with rising debt.  In the current election year, the Democrats 
are explicit in wanting higher taxes including a 4% surcharge on incomes over $5 million, 
higher capital gains taxes, capped deductions, taxing capital gains and dividends as ordinary 
income and expanding the estate tax [Lazear 2016]. 
To empirically verify GOVDEBT as a valid tax competitiveness proxy, we collect 
country tax competitiveness scores for OECD countries from Tax Foundation. In his seminal 
paper, Diamond [1965] develops a neoclassical growth model and shows that taxes are 
needed to finance government debt interest payments. Thus, high government debt should be 
negatively related to a country’s tax competitiveness. We find that the correlation between the 
difference in GOVDEBT between the U.S. and another OECD country and their difference in 
tax competitiveness scores is as high as 41%.5 By contrast, the correlation between the 																																																								
5 Note that when calculating the tax competitiveness score difference between the U.S. and another OECD 
country, we multiply the initial tax competitiveness scores by -1 so that larger values indicate less competitive 
tax systems. The U.S. ranks the 32th among the 34 OECD countries. See Appendix B.    
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statutory corporate income tax rate difference between the U.S. and another OECD country 
and their difference in tax competitiveness scores is only 25%.  
As a better tax competitiveness proxy, the data for GOVDEBT is also widely available 
and covers several decades for all OECD countries. Using GOVDEBT as a proxy for a 
country’s tax competitiveness, we address the following questions. Is U.S.-OECD tax 
competitiveness difference related to deal announcement returns and post-deal tax savings of 
the U.S. acquirers for U.S.-OECD outbound cross-border acquisitions? Is U.S.-OECD tax 
competitiveness difference related to U.S.-OECD cross-border acquisition deal flow?  
These questions are especially important due to the recent development in tax-
motivated cross-border outbound acquisitions from the U.S. to other countries. By acquiring a 
foreign target company, a U.S. company can shift its profits overseas and thus avoid U.S. 
taxes through internal transfer pricing and/or moving its operations abroad. It can then use 
these profits to invest overseas and/or repatriate the profits back to the U.S. under various 
non-recognition provisions allowed by U.S. tax code and regulations.6 An extreme form of 
tax-motivated outbound acquisitions, tax-inversion acquisition deals, results in the U.S. firm 
changing its legal domicile to the more tax competitive target firm country and thus entirely 
avoid paying U.S. taxes for all of its non-U.S. operations and profits.7  
Using a comprehensive sample of 1,884 completed cross-border acquisitions from the 
U.S. to other OECD countries announced between 1996 to 2013, we find that the U.S.-target 
country GOVDEBT difference is significantly and positively related to deal announcement 
return of the U.S. acquirer. A one-standard-deviation increase in GOVDEBT difference is on 
average related to a 1.34% increase in acquirer three-day cumulative abnormal return around 																																																								
6 Such transactions often result in the U.S. parent receiving cash, notes or other property from the overseas 
subsidiaries that are not recognized as dividend or gain to the U.S. parent. Also, many repatriation transactions 
from foreign subsidiaries to the U.S. parent are disguised as loans to the U.S. parent. See the written testimony of 
Samuel Maruca, Director of Transfer Pricing Operations of Internal Revenue Service (IRS), to the U.S. Congress 
(http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/subcommittees/investigations/hearings/offshore-profit-shifting-and-the-us-tax-
code_-part-2).  
7 According to a Wall Street Journal article RAICE, S. “How Tax Inversions Became the Hottest Trend in 
M&A.” The Wall Street Journal (2014).“tax inversions have been a major driver in cross-border deal making, 
accounting for 66% of proposed U.S. outbound deals this year, according to Thomson Reuters.” See 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-tax-inversions-became-the-hottest-trend-in-m-a-1407240175. In 1996, the U.S. 
government issued anti-inversion rules, but inversions continued. This prompted the government to release new 
rules in 2004. The American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 ended corporate tax inversion to a foreign country with 
no real business activity. However, the law allows tax inversions as long as there is real business operation in the 
foreign country and the former U.S. parent company owns less than 80% of the combined firm. As a response, 
corporate tax advisors created various techniques to inflate the size of the combined firm or to reduce the size of 
the U.S. parent MCKINNON, J. D. and D. PALETTA. “Obama Administration Issues New Rules to Combat 
Tax Inversions.” Ibid.. As a result, the U.S. government had to announce new rules to further discourage tax-
inversion motivated deals. After the new rules were released, U.S. pharmaceutical company Pfizer immediately 
terminated its US$160 billion agreement to acquire Irish pharmaceutical company Allergan and change the 
combined firm’s legal domicile to Ireland, suggesting that the acquisition is mainly tax-motivated.  	
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the deal announcement. For an average acquirer in our sample, this amounts to an increase in 
shareholder value of US$147 million. Our results are important as they are different from the 
findings in the previous M&A literature stating that acquirer deal announcement returns are 
on average insignificantly different from zero [Andrade et al. 2001] [Betton et al. 2008]. For 
example, Karolyi, and Taboada [2014] find that acquirers in their sample of cross-border bank 
acquisitions (which may not involve a U.S. firm as a takeover target or acquirer) have either 
negative or not significant announcement returns. 
Furthermore, we find that the U.S.-target country GOVDEBT difference is 
significantly and positively related to the U.S. acquirer’s tax saving post deal completion. A 
one-standard-deviation increase in GOVDEBT difference is on average related to a 0.70% 
reduction in annual cash tax paid as a percentage of total assets and a 2.47% increase in 
annual total tax avoidance as a percentage of total assets for the three years after deal 
completion. For an average acquirer in our sample, this amounts to a cash tax saving of 
US$148.21 million per year and a total tax avoidance of US$522.97 million per year. 
Consistent with the notion that statutory tax rate is a bad proxy for tax competitiveness; we 
find that U.S.-target country statutory corporate income tax rate difference has no effect on 
either the deal announcement return or the post-deal tax savings of the acquirer.  
Our results are robust to controlling for the U.S.-target country corporate governance 
strength difference, market valuation difference, market performance difference, development 
difference, growth difference, bilateral trade, a battery of firm characteristics, a battery of deal 
characteristics, target country fixed effects, acquirer industry fixed effects and year fixed 
effects. To further alleviate the concern of omitted-variable bias, we use historical (i.e., five 
years before the deal announcement) government debt difference and public social 
expenditures difference to instrument for GOVDEBT difference in two-stage instrumental 
variable regressions. A country with high historical government debt and public social 
expenditures will tend to have weak tax competitiveness (i.e., high GOVDEBT), but historical 
government debt difference and public social expenditures difference are unlikely to directly 
affect acquisition deal announcement returns and post-deal tax savings (other than through the 
tax competitiveness channel). We verify that the two instruments pass both the relevance 
(weak instrument) test and the exclusion (overidentification) test.  
Our results remain robust or even become stronger in two-stage instrumental variable 
regressions, suggesting that the uncovered relationships are unlikely driven by omitted 
variable bias. Consistent with GOVDEBT being a better proxy for country tax 
competitiveness, we further find that the positive effect of U.S.-target country GOVDEBT 
difference on acquirer deal announcement return is significantly greater when the acquisition 
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is a tax-inversion deal, through which the acquirer changes its legal domicile to the target 
country. 
Finally, we find that the U.S.-target country GOVDEBT difference is significantly and 
positively related to U.S.-target country deal flow. A one-standard-deviation increase in 
GOVDEBT difference between the U.S. and a target OECD country is on average related to a 
2.33% increase in the number of cross-border acquisitions from the U.S. to that target OECD 
country as a percentage of all domestic and cross-border acquisitions in that country. This 
finding remains robust when we control for U.S.-target country statutory corporate income tax 
rate difference, corporate governance strength difference, market valuation difference, market 
performance difference, development difference, growth difference, bilateral trade, religion, 
legal system, language, geographical distance, whether the two countries share common 
border, whether the two countries have colonial link, and year fixed effects. The finding 
remains robust when we use two-stage instrumental variable regressions with historical 
government debt difference and public social expenditures difference as instruments for 
GOVDEBT difference. Our finding strongly suggests that country tax competitiveness 
difference is an important driver of cross-border acquisition deal flow. 
Despite the recent development in tax-motivated outbound acquisitions from the U.S. 
to lower-tax countries, there are few studies in the literature that directly studies the role tax 
avoidance plays in such acquisitions. Based on a sample of U.S. domestic acquisitions, Hayn 
[1989] finds that tax attributes (e.g., net operating loss carryforwards and unused tax credits) 
of target firms are significantly associated with the abnormal returns to shareholders of both 
target and acquiring firms. Desai, and Hines [2002] examine the role of taxation in 26 tax 
inversions of U.S. multinationals in the 1982 to 2002 period and confirm that inversions yield 
tax benefits to inverting firms. However, only three inversions in their sample are acquisition-
related. Huizinga, and Voget [2009] find that the parent-subsidiary structure of multinational 
firms created by cross-border acquisitions is affected by the prospect of international double 
taxation. Specifically, the likelihood of parent firm location in a country following a cross-
border acquisition is reduced by high international double taxation of foreign-source income. 
At the same time, countries with high international double taxation attract smaller numbers of 
parent firms. Our study contributes to this developing literature by showing that GOVDEBT 
is a better measure of a country’s tax competitiveness and higher U.S.-target country 
GOVDEBT difference leads to higher acquirer deal announcement returns and post-deal tax 
savings for U.S. acquirers and greater U.S.-target country outbound acquisition deal flow.  
Our study is also related to the literature on cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As). For example, using a sample of cross-border acquisitions in 49 major countries in 
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period 1990 to 2002, Rossi, and Volpin [2004] find that acquirers tend to be domiciled in 
countries with higher investor protection than target countries, suggesting that firms opt out of 
weak corporate governance regime via cross-border M&A transactions. Erel et al. [2012] 
analyze a sample of 56,978 cross-border M&As between 1990 and 2007. They find that 
geography, the quality of accounting disclosure, and bilateral trade increase the likelihood of 
mergers between two countries. Moreover, acquirers tend to be located in countries whose 
stock market has increased in value, whose currency has recently appreciated, and that have a 
relatively high market-to-book value. Karolyi, and Taboada [2014] find that differences in 
bank regulations influence cross-border bank acquisition flows and the share price reactions 
to cross-border deal announcements. Using a sample of 7,297 domestic and 916 majority 
cross-border bank acquisitions announced between 1995 and 2012, they find that bank 
acquisition flows involve acquirers from countries with stronger regulations than their targets. 
Moreover, target and aggregate abnormal returns around deal announcements are positive and 
larger when acquirers come from more restrictive bank regulatory environments. 
Finally, our study is related to the literature on tax and foreign direct investment (FDI) 
[Altshuler et al. 2001, Boskin, and Gale 1987, Grubert, and Mutti 1991, Hartman 1984, Hines 
1996, Hines, and Rice 1994, Slemrod 1990, Young 1988]. This literature generally documents 
that increase in local tax rate discourages FDI. However, the literature does not distinguish 
between FDI due to M&As and other components of FDI.    
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and their 
sources. Section 3 investigates the effect of U.S.-target country GOVDEBT difference on deal 
announcement return and post-deal tax saving of the acquirer. Section 4 studies the effect of 
U.S.-target country GOVDEBT difference on U.S.-target country cross-border deal flow. 
Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Sample Formation 
2.1. Our Sample for Deal Flow Analysis  
We obtain a large and comprehensive sample of completed outbound M&A 
transactions from the U.S. to other OECD countries from the Thomson One Banker SDC 
database for the period 1996-2013.8 We impose the following filters to obtain our final 
sample: 1) the deal is classified as “Acquisition of Assets (AA)”, “Merger (M),” or 
“Acquisition of Majority Interest (AM)” by the data provider;9 2) the acquirer is domiciled in 
the U.S.; 3) the acquirer holds less than 50% of the shares of the target firm before deal 
announcement and ends up owning more than 50% of the shares of the target firm through the 
deal; 4) the deal value is at least US$1 million; 5) the target firm is domiciled in a non-U.S. 
OECD country; 6) the target firm is a public firm, a private firm, or a subsidiary; 7) multiple 
deals announced by the same acquirer on the same day are excluded. Our initial sample for 
the U.S.-OECD outbound deal flow analysis consists of 5,261 completed deals. Following 
Karolyi, and Taboada [2014], we construct a variable, Cross-border flow, which is the 
number of cross-border majority acquisitions in which the acquirer is from the U.S. and the 
target is from a non-U.S. OECD country in a year, as the percentage of the total number of all 
domestic and cross-border majority acquisitions in that target country during that year. The 
mean (median) of Cross-border flow is 11.91% (9.38%) with the standard deviation being 
11.88% for all target country-year observations in our sample (Panel B of Table 2). 
Table 1 provides a sample overview by year (Panel A) and by target country (Panel 
B). We see a wave of outbound transactions in the period 1998-2001 around the time of the 
Internet bubble and another wave in the period 2004-2007 preceding the recent financial 
crisis. The most important target countries are the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany, 
Australia, France, and the Netherlands. 
 2.2. Our Sample for Cross-Sectional Return and Tax Saving Analysis  
For the cross-sectional acquirer deal announcement return and post-deal tax saving 
analysis, we impose the additional requirement that the acquirer is a U.S. public firm listed on 
the AMEX, NYSE, or NASDAQ with available stock return and financial data. Following 
prior work [Chen et al. 2007, Karolyi, and Taboada 2014] we use two acquirer deal 
announcement return measures: CAR(-1; 1) and MAR(-1; 1). CAR(-1; 1) is the cumulative 
abnormal return (in percentage points) of the acquirer from one day before to one day after 																																																								
8 We focus on this sample period since KAUFMAN, D.; A. KRAAY and M. MASTRUZZI. “Governance 
Matters VIII- Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2008.” Policy Research Working Paper 
(2009).governance indicators for OECD countries, which we use to construct an importance control variable in 
this study, are available only during this period.   
9 According to Netter, Stegemoller, and Wintoki (2011), these three deal forms capture about 98% of M&A 
deals covered by the Thomson One Banker SDC database during the period 1992-2009. 
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the deal announcement date (day 0), where daily abnormal stock returns are computed using 
the market model and the CRSP value-weighted market returns, with the estimation window 
being days (-200, -60) prior to the deal announcement date [Chen, Harford, and Li 2007]. 
MAR(-1; 1) is the cumulative abnormal return (in percentage points) of the acquirer from one 
day before to one day after the deal announcement date (day 0), where daily abnormal stock 
return is calculated by subtracting the CRSP value-weighted market return from the stock 
return of the acquirer.  
Following prior literature [Andrade, Mitchel, and Stafford 2001, Moeller et al. 2004], 
we control for the following acquirer characteristics variables in our cross-sectional 
regressions: firm size (Firm size), return on assets (ROA), market to book equity ratio (MTB), 
leverage ratio (Leverage), past stock return (Past return), and institutional ownership of top 
five institutional investors (Top5 institutions). We further control for the following deal 
characteristics variables in our cross-sectional regressions: An indicator for all-cash deal (All 
cash), an indicator for all-stock deal (All stock), an indicator for diversifying transaction 
(Diversifying), an indicator for tender offer (Tender offer), the deal size relative to the 
acquirer’s total assets (Relativesize), an indicator for private target (Private target), and an 
indicator for subsidiary target (Subsidiary target). Stock return data is obtained from The 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP), financial data from Compustat as of the year-
end prior to the announcement of the deal, and deal data from the Thomson One Banker SDC 
database.  
The requirement of available acquirer stock return and financial data as well as deal 
data reduces our cross-sectional regression sample to 1,884 transactions, among which 23 are 
tax-inversion transactions (i.e., the acquirer changes its legal domicile to the target firm’s 
country after the deal completion). We identify inversion deals by studying the legal domicile 
of the acquirer before and after the deal through the Compustat database and also manually 
cross-checking with the Bloomberg Inversion Tracking database. The indicator variable, 
Inversion, equals 1 if the deal is an inversion deal and equals 0 otherwise.   
All country level variables are computed as differences between the U.S. and the 
target OECD country. Our country tax competitiveness proxy, GOVDEBT-1 (GOVDEBT-5), 
is the central government debt as a percentage of GDP in the year before (five years before) 
the deal announcement year. The data is from the OECD Statistics database. Kaufman is the 
average of all six Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi [2009] governance indicators in the year 
before the deal announcement year, which captures a country’s corporate governance 
strength[Karolyi, and Taboada 2014]. Pubexpend-2 is the sum of public social expenditures 
(scaled by GDP) in the two years before the deal announcement year. Tax (in percentage) is 
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the country statutory corporate income tax rate in the deal announcement year. Data for both 
Pubexpend-2 and Tax is obtained from the OECD Statistics database. Market MTB is the 
country’s value-weighted market-to-book equity ratio and Market R12 the country’s annual 
real stock market returns [Erel, Liao, and Weisbach 2012]. Data for both variables were 
obtained from Datastream for the year before the deal announcement year. GDP per capita is 
the log of real GDP (current US$) divided by the average population. GDP growth is the 
annual growth in real GDP. Both variables are obtained from the World Development 
Indicators. Bilateral trade is obtained from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics and is the 
maximum of bilateral import and export between a country pair in a year. These three 
variables are again measured in the year before the deal announcement year. 
We use three variables to measure acquirer post-deal tax savings. The first variable, Δ
CTXD3, is the post-deal change in the dollar amount of cash tax paid by the acquirer, which is 
the average amount of cash tax paid in the three fiscal years after the deal completion minus 
the average amount of cash tax paid in the three fiscal years before the deal announcement. 
The second variable, ΔCTXD/AT3, is the post-deal change in the amount of cash tax paid 
scaled by the acquirer’s total assets, which is the average cash tax paid as a percentage of total 
assets in the three fiscal years after the deal completion minus the average cash tax paid as a 
percentage of total assets in the three fiscal years before the deal announcement.10 The third 
variable, ΔAVOIDANCE3, is the post-deal change in total tax avoidance scaled by the 
acquirer’s total assets, which is the average total tax avoidance as a percentage of total assets 
in the three fiscal years after the deal completion minus the total tax avoidance as a 
percentage of total assets in the three fiscal years before the deal announcement. Following 
Frank et al. [2009], total tax avoidance as a percentage of total assets in a fiscal year 
(AVOIDANCE) is calculated as (pre-tax book income - ((current federal tax expense + current 
foreign tax expense) / statutory tax rate)) - (deferred tax expense / statutory tax rate), scaled 
by lagged total assets. The first two variables, ΔCTXD and ΔCTXD/AT, capture the post-
deal cash tax savings of acquirers, with negative values indicating post-deal reductions in cash 
tax paid. The third variable, ΔAVOIDANCE, captures the post-deal total tax avoidance of 
acquirers, with positive values indicating post-deal increases in total tax avoidance. Data used 
to construct these variables are obtained from Compustat.   
 
 																																																								
10 Note that we use total assets instead of pre-tax income as the scaler of cash tax paid because total assets are 
more difficult to manipulate. After deal completion, the U.S. acquirer can shift its profits overseas and reduce 
pre-tax income via, for example, internal transfer pricing.   
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2.3. Summary Statistics  
Table 2 provides summary statistics for all variables used in our study. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Panel A presents summary statistics 
for acquirer characteristics. Our acquirers are large and profitable U.S. public firms. In 
particular, the acquirers have average (median) total assets of US$21,172 million (US$929 
million), reflected in constant 2013 U.S. dollars. The mean (median) acquirer ROA is 0.03 
(0.05) and the mean (median) past stock return is 37.40% (17.76%). Panel B presents 
summary statistics for deal characteristics. As we can see, almost 40% of deals are all-cash 
transactions and 6% are all-stock deals. 44% of deals are diversifying transactions, where the 
acquirer and the target have different two-digit SIC codes. The mean (median) Relativesize is 
0.20 (0.05). Half of the target firms are private firms and 37% of the target firms are 
subsidiary firms. Thus, only around one tenth of the target firms are public firms. 
Panel C presents summary statistics for the country level variables, which are 
computed as the difference between the U.S. and another OECD country. In particular, the 
mean (median) GOVDEBT-1 is -0.74% (-3.98%) while the standard deviation is 23.49%, 
suggesting very large cross-sectional variations in U.S.-target country government debt 
difference compared with the mean and median. The mean (median) country statutory 
corporate income tax rate difference, Tax, is 5.95% (7.00%) while the standard deviation is 
2.83%, suggesting that the U.S. generally has higher statutory corporate income tax rates than 
the other OECD countries.  
Panel D presents summary statistics for acquirer deal announcement returns. The 
means and medians of acquirer deal announcement return variables are positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting U.S.-OECD outbound acquisitions are on 
average value creating for U.S. shareholders. For example, the mean (median) of CAR(-1; 1) 
is 0.77% (0.43%). This is in contrast with the finding in the M&A literature that acquirer deal 
announcement returns are on average insignificantly different from zero [Andrade, Mitchel, 
and Stafford 2001, Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn 2008]. For example, Karolyi, and Taboada 
[2014] find that acquirers in their sample of cross-border bank acquisitions (which may not 
involve a U.S. firm as a takeover target or acquirer) on average have zero deal announcement 
returns. 
Panel E presents the summary statistics of the acquirer tax saving variables. Looking 
at the change from three years before the deal announcement to three years after the deal 
completion, the mean (median) ΔCTXD3 is US$72.29 million (US$5.75 million), the mean 
(median) ΔCTXD/AT3 is 1.23% (0.55%), and the mean (median) ΔAVOIDANCE3 is -
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1.09% (0.08%). The standard deviations of these variables are all very large compared to their 
respective means and medians, suggesting very large cross-sectional variations.  
Panel F presents the summary statistics of U.S.-target country GOVDEBT difference 
by country pair. As we can see, the governments of Belgium, France, Greece, Hungary, Israel, 
Italy, Japan, Portugal and the United Kingdom appear to be more indebted than the U.S. 
government.     
 
 
 3. The Effect of U.S.-Target Country GOVDEBT Difference on Acquirer Deal 
Announcement Return and Post-deal Tax Saving  
3.1. Validation of GOVDEBT as a Tax Competitiveness Measure  
Starting from 2014, Tax Foundation provides tax competitiveness scores for all OECD 
countries based on a comprehensive list of over 40 tax policy variables. We collect country 
tax competitiveness scores for OECD countries from Tax Foundation for year 2014 and 2015 
(see Table A1 in the Appendix). Panel A of Table 3 presents the correlations of government 
debt as a percentage of GDP (GOVDEBT), country tax competitiveness score 
(TAXCOMPET), and country statutory corporate income tax rate (Tax). All variables are 
measured as the differences between the U.S. and a non-U.S. OECD country. When 
calculating the correlation between GOVDEBT and TAXCOMPET, GOVDEBT is the average 
difference in year 2012 and 2013 and TAXCOMPET is measured as of 2014 (results are very 
similar if we use the average TAXCOMPET in year 2014 and 2015 instead). We multiply tax 
competitiveness scores by -1 before computing TAXCOMPET so that the difference will be 
positive if the U.S. is less tax-competitive than another OECD country. Correlations between 
GOVDEBT and Tax are calculated over the entire sample period 1996-2013 since the data for 
Tax is available over the entire sample period.   
As we can see, the correlation between GOVDEBT and TAXCOMPET is as high as 
41%. By contrast, the correlation between Tax and TAXCOMPET is only 25%, and the 
correlation between GOVDEBT and Tax is only 15%. All of the correlations are highly 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This finding suggests that GOVDEBT is a better proxy 
for country tax competitiveness than statutory corporate income tax rate. 
 
 3.1. The Effect of GOVDEBT on Acquirer Deal Announcement Return  
Using multivariate OLS regressions, we next examine the effect of the pre-acquisition 
U.S.-target country government debt to GDP difference, GOVDEBT-1, on acquirer deal 
announcement returns. To alleviate the concern for omitted variable bias, we control for a 
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battery of country level variables including the U.S.-target country statutory corporate income 
tax rate difference (Tax), corporate governance strength difference (Kaufman), market 
valuation difference (Market MTB), market performance difference (Market R12), 
development difference (GDP per capita), growth difference (GDP growth), and bilateral 
trade (Bilateral trade), acquirer characteristics variables including firm size (Firm size), 
profitability (ROA), market-to-book equity ratio (MTB), leverage (Leverage), past stock return 
(Past return), and institutional ownership (Top5 institutions), and deal characteristics 
variables including the all-cash indicator (All cash), all-stock indicator (All stock), 
diversifying-deal indicator (Diversifying), tender-offer indicator (Tender offer), deal size 
relative to acquirer total assets (Relative size), private-target indicator (Private target) and 
subsidiary-target indicator (Subsidiary target). We further include target country fixed effects, 
acquirer industry fixed effects and year fixed effects. Following Erel, Liao, and Weisbach 
[2012] and Karolyi, and Taboada [2014], we cluster the standard errors at the target country 
level. The results are presented in Panel A of Table 4. 
Column 1 and 2 show that GOVDEBT-1 is significantly and positively related acquirer 
deal announcement return measured at the 1% level for the three-day event window. The 
economic magnitude is large as well. A one-standard-deviation increase in government debt 
to GDP difference is on average related to a 1.08% (23.49*0.046%) increase in acquirer 
three-day cumulative abnormal return around the deal announcement. For an average acquirer 
in our sample, this amounts to an increase in shareholder value of US$119 million (11,007.22 
million*1.08%). By contrast, the U.S.-target country statutory corporate income tax rate 
difference, Tax, is insignificant across all models, suggesting that it is not a good tax 
competitiveness proxy.  
In terms of the control variables, we find that firm size and diversifying deal are 
negatively related to acquirer deal announcement returns, while tender offer, relative deal 
size, private target and subsidiary target are positively related to acquirer deal announcement 
returns. The findings on the control variables are generally consistent with those documented 
in the M&A literature [Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn 2008, Fuller et al. 2002, Harford 1999, 
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz 2004]. 
As a further validity check, we use country tax competitiveness difference from Tax 
Foundation, TAXCOMPET, instead of GOVDEBT-1, in acquirer deal announcement return 
regressions. If GOVDEBT-1 is a proxy for country tax competitiveness difference, we 
conjecture that TAXCOMPET should be positively related to acquirer deal announcement 
returns as well. Since data for TAXCOMPET is only available in 2014 and 2015, we use 
TAXCOMPET in 2014 to match with all sample deals announced in the period 2012-2013. By 
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doing so, we assume a degree of stickiness in countries’ degree of tax competitiveness. The 
comparison of the 2014 and 2015 tax data confirms this assumption. The results are presented 
in Panel B of Table 3. Although the sample size becomes much smaller, TAXCOMPET is also 
positively and significantly loaded across all four acquirer deal announcement return 
regressions, consistent with our conjecture.  
 
 
3.2. The Effect of GOVDEBT on Acquirer Post-Deal Tax Saving  
Next, we examine the effect of GOVDEBT-1 on acquirer post-deal tax savings using 
multivariate regressions. The dependent variables are the three acquirer post-deal tax saving 
measures, ΔCTXD3, ΔCTXD/AT3, and ΔAVOIDANCE3, described in Section 2. Similar to 
the deal announcement return regressions, we include country level controls, acquirer 
characteristics and deal characteristics as well as target country fixed effects, acquirer 
industry fixed effects and year fixed effects in the regression models. To account for the 
potential mean reversion of firm cash tax payment and total tax avoidance, we further include 
as additional control the pre-acquisition level of cash tax paid (CTXD-3), cash tax paid as a 
percentage of total assets (CTXD/AT-3), or total tax avoidance as a percentage of total assets 
(AVOIDANCE3) averaged over the three years immediately before the deal announcement. 
Standard errors are clustered at the target country level [Erel, Liao, and Weisbach 2012, 
Karolyi, and Taboada 2014]. The results are presented in Table 5.  
 
 
3.3. Two-Stage Instrumental Variable Regressions  
Although we include a battery of country-level, firm-level and deal-level controls as 
well as country, industry and year fixed effects across all regression models, there is still a 
potential concern that some unknown omitted variables are correlated with both the pre-
acquisition U.S.-target country GOVDEBT difference and acquirer deal announcement 
returns or post-deal tax savings. In this section, we employ the instrumental variable 
regression approach to extract the exogenous component of GOVDEBT difference and relate 
it to acquirer deal announcement returns or post-deal tax savings. We need instrumental 
variables that are related to pre-acquisition U.S.-target country tax competitiveness difference 
(as proxied by GOVDEBT-1) but are not related to acquirer deal announcement return or post-
deal tax saving (other than through the tax competitiveness channel).  
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We use two instrumental variables, historical government debt difference (GOVDEBT-
5) and public social expenditures difference (Pubexpend-2), to instrument for pre-acquisition 
U.S.-target country GOVDEBT difference. GOVDEBT-5 is the historical U.S.-target country 
GOVDEBT difference five years before the deal announcement year. Pubexpend-2 is the sum 
of public social expenditures (scaled by GDP) two years before the deal announcement year. 
We argue that a country with both high historical government debt and high public social 
expenditures will tend to have weak current tax competitiveness (i.e., as proxied by high 
current government debt), but historical government debt difference and public social 
expenditures difference between the U.S. and the target country are unlikely to directly affect 
acquirer deal announcement returns and post-deal tax savings in U.S. outbound acquisitions 
(other than through affecting current U.S.-target country tax competitiveness difference). We 
follow the approach by Field et al. [2013] who study the effects of busy directors post-IPO 
(five or 10 years following the IPO). Their instrumental variables include a dummy variable 
for the presence of busy directors at the IPO as there is little reason to expect busy boards to 
directly influence firm value several years after the IPO.  
Column 1 in Panel B of Table 4 presents the first-stage result of regressing 
GOVDEBT-1 on the two instrumental variables plus control variables and fixed effects using 
our full sample. As expected, both instruments are significantly and positively related to 
GOVDEBT-1 at least at the 5% level. Column 2 and 3 in Panel B of Table 4 (columns 4-6 of 
Table 5) present the second-stage result of regressing acquirer deal announcement return 
measures (post-deal tax saving measures) on the exogenous (fitted) component of 
GOVDEBT-1 plus controls and fixed effects.11  
The Angrist-Pischke F-statistic and Hansen J-statistic indicate the regressions are well 
specified. The p-values of Angrist-Pischke’s F test statistic for weak instrument are 0.000 in 
all regression models, strongly rejecting the null hypothesis that the instruments are weak 
(note that critical values for the p-values are from Stock, and Yogo [2005]. The p-values of 
Hansen’s J overidentification test statistic are very large across all regression models, 
indicating that the two instruments are uncorrelated with the error terms of the second-stage 
regressions [Hansen 1982]. Thus, the weak-instrument and overidentification test statistics 
suggest that the relevance and exclusion conditions are both satisfied for our two-stage 
instrumental variable regressions. Importantly, Panel column 2 and 3 in Panel B of Table 4 
and column 4-6 of Table 5 show that our main findings do not change in any qualitative 
manner (the results even get stronger) when we use the exogenous (fitted) component of 																																																								
11 Since the first-stage results of these 2SLS regression models are all very similar to that in Panel C of Table 4, 
they are omitted from reporting for brevity but are available from us upon request.  
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GOVDEBT-1 in the regressions, suggesting that the findings are unlikely to be driven by 
some unknown omitted variables. 
It is clear that the coefficient of GOVDEBT-1 is negative when ΔCTXD3 an Δ
CTXD/AT3 is the dependent variables and positive when ΔAVOIDANCE3 are the dependent 
variables; moreover, the coefficient of GOVDEBT-1 is statistically significant in 5 out of the 
six regression models. Consistent with our expectation, pre-acquisition U.S.-target country 
government debt to GDP difference is also significantly related to the U.S. acquirer’s post-
deal tax saving benefits. For example, column 5 of Table 5 shows that a one-standard-
deviation increase in GOVDEBT difference is, on average, related to a 0.70% reduction 
(23.49*(-0.030%)) in annual cash tax paid and a 2.47% increase (23.49*0.105%) in annual 
total tax avoidance (column 6), as a percentage of total assets, for the three years after deal 
completion (compared with the three years before deal announcement). For an average 
acquirer in our sample, this amounts to a cash tax payment reduction of US$148 million per 
year and a total tax avoidance increase of US$329 million per year (the mean acquirer total 
assets is US$22,231 million, as shown in Panel A of Table 2). Consistent with statutory tax 
rate being a bad tax competitiveness proxy, we again find that the coefficient of U.S.-target 
country statutory corporate income tax rate difference, Tax, is insignificant across all models 
in Table 5.  
In terms of the control variables (column 5 and 6), we find that the coefficient of 
acquirer leverage is significantly negative when ΔCTXD/AT3 is the dependent variable and 
that the coefficient of acquirer firm size significantly positive when ΔAVOIDANCE3 is the 
dependent variables, suggesting that larger acquirers and acquirers with higher leverage ratios 
are better able to capture post-deal tax saving benefits. The coefficient of ROA is significantly 
positive when ΔCTXD/AT3, and ΔAVOIDANCE3 are the dependent variables, suggesting 
that after deal completion, profitable firms experience both an increase in cash tax paid and an 
increase in total tax avoidance, as a percentage of total assets. The other control variables 
yield either mixed or insignificant results. 
To summarize, we find that the pre-acquisition U.S.-target country GOVDEBT 
difference is significantly and positively related to both deal announcement return and post-
deal tax saving of the U.S. acquirer. 
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3.4. Tax-Inversion Deals  
As discussed earlier, tax-inversion acquisition deals result in the U.S. firm changing 
its legal domicile to the more tax-competitive target firm country after deal completion and 
thus entirely avoid paying U.S. taxes for all of its non-U.S. operations and profits. Therefore, 
since US.-target country government debt difference is a better proxy for country tax 
competitiveness difference, we expect the effect of GOVDEBT-1 on acquirer deal 
announcement return should be larger when the acquisition is a tax-inversion deal. To 
examine this conjecture, we regress the acquirer deal announcement return measures on 
GOVDEBT-1, the Inversion indicator, and their interaction terms plus controls and fixed 
effects in multivariate regressions. The results are presented in column 3 and 4 in Panel A of 
Table 4.  
In addition to the fact that GOVDEBT-1 is positively loaded in all regression models, 
we find that the coefficients of both GOVDEBT-1*Inversion and Inversion are significantly 
positive at the 1% level across all regression models, consistent with our expectation. Thus, 
the positive effect of U.S.-target country GOVDEBT difference on acquirer deal 
announcement return is indeed larger when the acquisition is a tax-inversion transaction, 
through which the acquirer changes its legal domicile and completely avoids paying U.S. 
taxes for all of its non-U.S. operations.12 
 
 
4. The Effect of U.S.-Target Country GOVDEBT Difference on Cross-border Deal Flow  
In this section, we examine the effect of U.S.-target country GOVDEBT difference on 
U.S.-target country cross-border acquisition deal flow. Since our earlier evidence suggests 
that U.S.-target country GOVDEBT difference is a better proxy for U.S.-target country tax 
competitiveness difference, we hence expect it to also be positively related to U.S.-OECD 
country cross-border acquisition deal flow if U.S. firms (partially) opt out of the less tax-
competitive U.S. system via outbound acquisitions into the more tax-competitive OECD 
countries. 
Following Karolyi, and Taboada [2014], our dependent variable in the deal flow 
regressions, Cross-border flow, is measured as the number of cross-border majority 
acquisitions in which the acquirer is from the U.S. and the target is from a non-U.S. OECD 
country in a year, as the percentage of the total number of all domestic and cross-border 																																																								
12 We cannot examine the impact of Inversion on acquirer post-deal tax savings because we check and find that 
after deal completion, the information to construct the acquirer cash tax payment and total tax avoidance 
measures is missing for all of these tax-inversion deals in our sample.    
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majority acquisitions in that target country during that year. In all regressions, we also control 
for a battery of country level variables including the U.S.-target country statutory corporate 
income tax rate difference (Tax-1), corporate governance strength difference (Kaufman), 
market valuation difference (Market MTB), market performance difference (Market R12), 
development difference (GDP per capita), growth difference (GDP growth), bilateral trade 
(Bilateral trade), religion indicator (Same religion), legal system indicator (Same law), 
language indicator (Same language), geographical distance (Distance), the indicators of 
whether the two countries share common border (Sharing border) and whether the two 
countries have colonial link (Colonial link), as well as year fixed effects. Standard errors are 
again clustered at the target country level. Table 6 presents the results.   
The OLS regression result is presented in column 2. We find that the U.S.-target 
country GOVDEBT difference (GOVDEBT-1) is significantly and positively related to the 
one-year-ahead U.S.-target country acquisition deal flow at the 5% level. A one-standard-
deviation increase in GOVDEBT difference between the U.S. and a target OECD country is, 
on average, related to a 2.16% increase in the number of cross-border acquisitions from the 
U.S. to that target OECD country as a percentage of all domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions in that country (23.49*0.092%) during the next year. We also use two-stage 
instrumental variable regression (2SLS) with historical government debt difference 
(GOVDEBT-5) and public social expenditures difference (Pubexpend-2) as instruments for 
GOVDEBT difference. The p-value of Angrist-Pischke’s F test statistic for weak instrument 
is 0.000, rejecting the null hypothesis that the instruments are weak. The p-value of Hansen’s 
J overidentification test statistic is 0.281, indicating that the two instruments are uncorrelated 
with the error term of the second-stage regression. Importantly, the first-stage of the 2SLS 
regression in column 1 shows that the two instruments are positively and significantly related 
to U.S.-target country GOVDEBT difference; column 3 shows the second-stage of the 2SLS 
regression. The exogenous (fitted) component of GOVDEBT-1 continues to be positively and 
significantly related to the dependent variable, Cross-border flow, at the 5% level.  
To summarize, our finding suggests that country tax competitiveness difference is an 
important driver of cross-border acquisition deal flow. 
 
 
5. Conclusion   
In this paper, we propose and verify that a country’s government debt to GDP ratio 
(GOVDEBT) is a better proxy than statutory corporate income tax rate for the country’s true 
tax competitiveness. The data for GOVDEBT is also widely available and covers several 
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decades for all OECD countries. Using GOVDEBT as a proxy for country tax 
competitiveness, we address the following important questions. Is U.S.-OECD tax 
competitiveness difference related to deal announcement returns and post-deal tax savings of 
the U.S. acquirers for U.S.-OECD outbound cross-border acquisitions? Is U.S.-OECD tax 
competitiveness difference related to U.S.-OECD cross-border acquisition deal flow?  
Using a comprehensive sample of completed cross-border outbound acquisitions from 
the U.S. to other OECD countries announced in the period 1996 to 2013, we find that the 
U.S.-target country GOVDEBT difference is significantly and positively related to deal 
announcement return and post-deal tax saving of the U.S. acquirer. Our results are robust to 
controlling for a battery of country level characteristics, firm characteristics, and deal 
characteristics as well as target country fixed effects, acquirer industry fixed effects and year 
fixed effects. Our results remain robust in two-stage instrumental variable regressions, 
suggesting that the uncovered relationships are unlikely driven by omitted variable bias. 
Consistent with GOVDEBT being a better proxy for country tax competitiveness, we further 
find that the positive effect of U.S.-target country GOVDEBT difference on acquirer deal 
announcement return is significantly greater when the acquisition is a tax-inversion deal, 
through which the acquirer changes its legal domicile to the target country and entirely avoid 
paying U.S. taxes for its non-U.S. operations.         
Finally, we find that the U.S.-target country GOVDEBT difference is significantly and 
positively related to U.S.-target country outbound deal flow. This finding on deal flow is 
robust to controlling for a battery of country level characteristics plus year fixed effects. The 
finding remains robust when we use two-stage instrumental variable regression. Our finding 
strongly suggests that country tax competitiveness difference is an important driver of cross-
border acquisition deal flow. 
The U.S. regulators responded to the recent episode of tax-motivated outbound 
transactions by imposing a series of new rules to block such deals (for example, the anti-
inversion rules in 1996, the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, and the new rules to further 
discourage tax-inversion motivated deals in 2016). An important policy implication from our 
study is that, instead of introducing new rules to block tax-motivated outbound transactions, 
the best way to solve the problem once and for all is to make the U.S. system more tax 
competitive and hence level the playing field between the U.S. and other developed countries. 
This will diminish the economic incentives for U.S. companies to move overseas with the 
purpose of avoiding unfavorable U.S. taxes. Without solving the fundamental incentive 
problem, U.S. firms will surely find new creative ways to move overseas despite the new 
rules introduced by the government. 
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Table 1. Cross-border acquisitions within OECD countries, 1996-2013. 
The sample consists of all completed outbound M&A transactions from the U.S. to other 
OECD countries from the Thomson One Banker SDC database for the period 1996-2013 with 
the selection criteria as follows: 1) the deal is classified as “Acquisition of Assets (AA)”, 
“Merger (M),” or “Acquisition of Majority Interest (AM)” by the data provider; 2) the 
acquirer is domiciled in the U.S.; 3) the acquirer holds less than 50% of the shares of the 
target firm before deal announcement and ends up owning more than 50% of the shares of the 
target firm through the deal; 4) the deal value is at least US$1 million; 5) the target firm is 
domiciled in a non-U.S. OECD country; 6) the target firm is a public firm, a private firm, or a 
subsidiary; 7) multiple deals announced by the same acquirer on the same day are excluded. 
Panel A shows all announced deals by year. Panel B presents all completed deals by year. 
Panel C shows all announced deals by target country and Panel D shows all completed deals 
by target country. Reported values are in constant (2013) U.S. dollars. 
 
Panel A - Announced deals by year 
Year Total announced Total value (US$M) Mean value (US$M) 
1996 270 $43,811.19 $162.26 
1997 387 $82,024.37 $211.95 
1998 518 $129,136.70 $249.30 
1999 431 $157,168.90 $364.66 
2000 441 $119,670.40 $271.36 
2001 308 $114,959.70 $373.25 
2002 257 $54,391.20 $211.64 
2003 256 $70,465.73 $275.26 
2004 329 $90,074.84 $273.78 
2005 360 $109,711.50 $304.75 
2006 391 $216,862.20 $554.63 
2007 395 $265,958.90 $673.31 
2008 287 $82,057.21 $285.91 
2009 178 $72,590.52 $407.81 
2010 271 $76,393.18 $281.89 
2011 285 $105,990.40 $371.90 
2012 288 $122,574.20 $425.60 
2013 270 $92,813.49 $343.75 
Total (Average) 5,922 $2,006,654.63 $335.72 
 	
	 26	
Panel B - Completed deals by year 
Year # Completed Total value (US$M) Mean value (US$M) 
1996 237 $32,469.78 $137.00 
1997 348 $71,945.71 $206.74 
1998 452 $119,976.30 $265.43 
1999 381 $139,690.90 $366.64 
2000 391 $98,648.31 $252.30 
2001 275 $106,190.10 $386.15 
2002 227 $46,280.59 $203.88 
2003 229 $67,698.88 $295.63 
2004 293 $79,495.23 $271.31 
2005 336 $101,967.90 $303.48 
2006 355 $142,881.60 $402.48 
2007 358 $190,466.80 $532.03 
2008 244 $52,594.66 $215.55 
2009 158 $71,225.98 $450.80 
2010 240 $63,670.09 $265.29 
2011 246 $101,623.80 $413.10 
2012 257 $104,800.00 $407.78 
2013 234 $69,202.46 $295.74 
Total (Average) 5,261 $1,660,829.09 $315.07 
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Panel C - Announced deals by target country 
Target Total announced Total value (US$M) Mean value (US$M) 
Australia 407 $123,137.40 $302.55 
Austria 24 $7,286.40 $303.60 
Belgium 69 $30,271.22 $438.71 
Canada 1,314 $386,281.30 $293.97 
Chile 37 $5,733.01 $154.95 
Czech Republic 21 $5,621.46 $267.69 
Denmark 63 $14,117.06 $224.08 
Estonia 1 $6.26 $6.26 
Finland 46 $13,069.28 $284.11 
France 347 $77,945.26 $224.63 
Germany 470 $166,470.50 $354.19 
Greece 9 $3,907.29 $434.14 
Hungary 17 $1,897.69 $111.63 
Iceland 3 $887.80 $295.93 
Ireland 96 $39,971.29 $416.37 
Israel 163 $29,223.85 $179.29 
Italy 130 $39,999.53 $307.69 
Japan 86 $50,595.19 $588.32 
Korea, Rep. 88 $30,071.59 $341.72 
Luxembourg 19 $19,297.36 $1,015.65 
Mexico 144 $44,272.62 $307.45 
Netherlands 197 $144,027.30 $731.10 
New Zealand 54 $5,691.34 $105.40 
Norway 86 $32,010.31 $372.21 
Poland 27 $7,318.09 $271.04 
Portugal 6 $811.19 $135.20 
Slovak Republic 3 $805.78 $268.59 
Slovenia 1 $116.66 $116.66 
Spain 129 $25,138.83 $194.87 
Sweden 153 $57,343.52 $374.79 
Switzerland 120 $67,278.27 $560.65 
Turkey 9 $364.36 $40.48 
 	
	 28	
United Kingdom 1,583 $575,685.80 $363.67 
Total (Average) 5,922 $2,006,654.78 $314.78 
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Panel D - Completed deals by target country 
Target: # Completed Total Value (US$M) Mean Value (US$M) 
Australia 357 $77,473.38 $217.01 
Austria 21 $7,033.94 $334.95 
Belgium 62 $26,717.13 $430.92 
Canada 1,115 $291,279.90 $261.24 
Chile 30 $5,119.62 $170.65 
Czech Republic 21 $5,621.46 $267.69 
Denmark 62 $14,047.87 $226.58 
Estonia 1 $6.26 $6.26 
Finland 43 $12,552.81 $291.93 
France 319 $72,789.59 $228.18 
Germany 436 $154,780.50 $355.00 
Greece 4 $2,221.49 $555.37 
Hungary 17 $1,897.69 $111.63 
Iceland 3 $887.80 $295.93 
Ireland 84 $32,596.42 $388.05 
Israel 141 $27,868.13 $197.65 
Italy 113 $37,971.91 $336.03 
Japan 80 $40,778.85 $509.74 
Korea, Rep. 58 $18,606.10 $320.79 
Luxembourg 15 $19,102.67 $1,273.51 
Mexico 119 $39,536.42 $332.24 
Netherlands 179 $130,364.00 $728.29 
New Zealand 48 $4,625.18 $96.36 
Norway 69 $21,016.57 $304.59 
Poland 23 $4,846.88 $210.73 
Portugal 5 $294.47 $58.89 
Slovak Republic 2 $803.27 $401.63 
Slovenia 1 $116.66 $116.66 
Spain 122 $24,812.57 $203.38 
Sweden 144 $56,055.91 $389.28 
Switzerland 107 $62,009.97 $579.53 
Turkey 8 $279.09 $34.89 
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United Kingdom 1,452 $466,714.40 $321.43 
Total (Average) 5,261 $1,660,828.89 $319.91 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of acquirer characteristics and country level variables. 
The table shows summary statistics of the main variables. All variables are winsorized at the 
top/bottom 1% of the distribution. Panel A shows descriptive statistics of the acquirers in 
majority cross-border acquisitions. Data is as of the year-end prior to the announcement of the 
deal. See Appendix A for variable definitions. Panel B presents descriptive statistics of deal 
characteristics. Panel C shows country level characteristics. All country level variables are 
computed as differences between the acquirer country (U.S.) and the target country. Panel D 
shows descriptive statistics of announcement returns (CARs, MARs) for acquirers in 
completed cross-border majority acquisitions announced between 1996 and 2013. Panel E 
shows summary statistics of our tax avoidance measures. Panel F shows summary statistics on 
GOVDEBT-1 by country pair. Detailed definitions of all variables are found in Appendix A. 
 
Panel A - Acquirer characteristics 
  Obs Mean Median StdDev Minimum Maximum 
Total Assets 1,884 21,172.71 929.68 129342.56 1.86 2031989.00 
Firm size 1,884 7.10 6.98 2.10 1.63 13.21 
Leverage 1,884 0.26 0.22 0.24 0.00 0.97 
Market value 1,884 11,007.22 1,279.654 3,7381.1 3.65 467,092.9 
MTB 1,884 4.07 2.68 4.64 0.57 31.70 
Past return 1,884 37.40 17.76 84.74 -77.44 450.00 
ROA 1,884 0.02 0.05 0.15 -1.10 0.26 
Top5 institutions 1,884 0.26 0.26 0.10 0.00 0.56 
 
 
Panel B - Deal characteristics 
  Obs Mean Median StdDev Minimum Maximum 
All cash 1,884 0.38 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 
All stock 1,884 0.06 0.00 0.24 0.00 1.00 
Diversifying 1,884 0.44 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Inversion 1,884 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00 
Private target 1,884 0.51 1.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Relative size 1,884 0.20 0.05 0.56 0.00 8.09 
Subsidiary target 1,884 0.37 0.00 0.48 0.00 1.00 
Tender offer 1,884 0.06 0.00 0.23 0.00 1.00 
Cross-border flow 345 11.91 9.38 11.18 0 85.71 
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Panel C - Country level characteristics 
  Obs Mean Median StdDev Minimum Maximum 
Bilateral trade 1,884 0.10 0.06 0.11 0.00 0.31 
GOVDEBT-1 1,884 -0.74 -3.98 23.49 -91.11 73.42 
GOVDEBT-1*Inversion 1,884 -0.02 0.00 0.63 -26.18 0.57 
GOVDEBT-5 1,776 -3.82 -5.19 20.74 -91.11 46.42 
GDP growth 1,884 0.17 0.21 1.62 -5.65 8.43 
GDP per capita 1,884 0.27 0.24 0.19 -0.44 1.34 
Kaufman 1,884 -0.12 -0.20 0.35 -0.64 1.59 
Market MTB 1,884 0.84 0.62 0.78 -0.95 3.31 
Market R12 1,884 -2.15 -1.46 14.18 -89.27 51.52 
PUBEXPEND-2 1,883 -3.53 -3.43 4.06 -11.47 6.80 
Tax 1,884 5.95 7.00 2.83 1.00 10.00 
 
 
Panel D - Announcement returns 
  Obs Mean Median StdDev Minimum Maximum 
CAR(-1; 1) 1,884 0.77 0.43 6.37 -20.02 27.28 
MAR(-1; 1) 1,884 0.96 0.53 6.45 -19.97 27.92 
 
 
Panel E - Tax avoidance measures 
  Obs Mean Median StdDev Minimum Maximum 
ΔAVOIDANCE3 1,018 -1.09 0.08 12.80 -61.81 57.36 
ΔAVOIDANCE-3 1,455 -2.17 1.01 16.54 -121.37 25.28 
ΔCTXD3 1,190 72.29 5.75 267.96 -484.33 1560.00 
ΔCTXD-3 1,669 146.90 14.74 419.48 -2.79 2683.33 
ΔCTXD/AT3 1,190 1.23 0.55 2.92 -5.73 17.14 
ΔCTXD/AT-3 1,669 1.79 1.37 1.67 -0.35 8.28 
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Panel F - Central government debt - country pairs 
Country pair Mean Median StdDev Minimum Maximum 
USA - Australia 33.58 29.84 10.47 22.86 59.59 
USA - Austria -9.49 -11.34 15.83 -25.97 17.02 
USA - Belgium -43.85 -56.17 27.17 -66.72 4.84 
USA - Canada 5.93 3.94 14.54 -7.79 40.78 
USA - Chile 35.01 35.01 0.00 35.01 35.01 
USA - Czech Republic 25.46 19.11 17.78 11.14 53.78 
USA - Denmark 2.98 3.32 24.51 -25.84 42.17 
USA - Finland -1.71 -5.88 16.88 -19.66 43.28 
USA - France -9.25 -15.94 8.55 -17.13 7.48 
USA - Germany 5.69 -3.62 13.86 -5.19 39.10 
USA - Greece -76.13 -70.91 9.04 -86.57 -70.91 
USA - Hungary -18.80 -21.34 13.44 -33.34 9.62 
USA - Ireland 1.58 3.43 11.24 -26.18 15.87 
USA - Israel -47.58 -54.21 15.21 -62.95 -13.44 
USA - Italy -58.22 -61.42 11.74 -70.25 -18.76 
USA - Japan -77.93 -90.48 21.92 -91.11 -16.18 
USA - Korea, Rep. 12.71 12.33 7.12 5.97 29.34 
USA - Luxembourg 42.42 35.40 13.38 34.58 73.22 
USA - Mexico 16.08 15.38 5.16 11.30 33.81 
USA - Netherlands -2.88 -7.71 10.47 -10.26 28.35 
USA - New Zealand 13.26 12.31 9.29 -0.03 30.82 
USA - Norway 28.14 23.57 18.13 14.21 73.42 
USA - Poland -0.57 -6.02 10.20 -10.08 11.60 
USA - Portugal -27.97 -28.70 4.14 -31.69 -23.51 
USA - Spain 5.87 -0.21 17.19 -13.29 35.55 
USA - Sweden -0.98 -10.08 27.92 -28.77 58.99 
USA - Switzerland 25.08 18.95 19.75 5.03 65.87 
USA - United Kingdom -8.09 -5.93 6.64 -24.26 -2.89 
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Table 3. Correlations matrix and cumulative abnormal returns. 
The table shows the correlations matrix. All country level variables are computed as 
differences between the acquirer country (U.S.) and the target country. Correlations between 
GOVDEBT and TAXCOMPET are as of 2012 and 2013. TAXCOMPET is measured as of 
2014. Correlations between GOVDEBT and Tax are calculated over the period 1996-2013. 
Correlations TAXCOMPET and Tax are as of 2014. TAXCOMPET measures the business 
competitiveness of national tax systems as of 2014 and was obtained from the Tax 
Foundation. Note that we changed the sign of TAXCOMPET by multiplying the initial value 
by minus 1. Thus, large values indicate a less competitive tax system. Panel B presents results 
from OLS regressions over the period 2012-2013. The dependent variables represent 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR and MAR) for acquirers over the period t= -1 to t= +1 
around the announcement day. CAR(-1; 1) is the cumulative abnormal return (in percentage 
points) of the acquirer from one day before to one day after the deal announcement date (day 
0), where daily abnormal stock returns are computed using the market model and the CRSP 
value-weighted market returns, with the estimation window being days (-200, -60) prior to the 
deal announcement date (Chen, Harford, and Li (2007)). MAR(-1; 1) is the cumulative 
abnormal return (in percentage points) of the acquirer from one day before to one day after 
the deal announcement date (day 0), where daily abnormal stock return is calculated by 
subtracting the CRSP value-weighted market return from the stock return of the acquirer. All 
returns for U.S. firms are obtained from CRSP. Independent variables are computed as 
differences between the acquirer country (U.S.) and the target country. Detailed definitions of 
all variables are found in Appendix A. We include target country, acquirer industry and year 
fixed effects (not shown) in all regressions and cluster standard errors by target country. 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * , ** , ***  indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A - Correlations matrix 
 
TAXCOMPET GOVDEBT Tax 
TAXCOMPET 1 
  GOVDEBT 0.41*** 1 
 Tax 0.25*** 0.15*** 1 
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Panel B - OLS regressions 
 
1 2 
 CAR(-1; 1) MAR(-1: 1) 
   TAXCOMPET 7.224** 6.853* 
 
(3.498) (3.435) 
Market MTB 19.892** 18.524** 
 
(9.111) (8.731) 
Market R12 -0.372* -0.373* 
 
(0.195) (0.191) 
Kaufman 98.152** 92.387* 
 
(47.249) (45.640) 
GDP per capita -384.829* -371.103* 
 
(193.917) (191.622) 
GDP growth 2.283** 2.167** 
 
(0.970) (0.923) 
Bilateral trade -677.976*** -638.495*** 
 
(196.827) (192.118) 
Firm size 0.009 0.045 
 
(0.242) (0.242) 
ROA -8.917*** -8.074** 
 
(3.111) (3.002) 
MTB -0.010 0.005 
 
(0.154) (0.165) 
Leverage 4.294 4.028 
 
(2.987) (3.256) 
Past return 0.021 0.025 
 
(0.026) (0.026) 
Top5 institutions 9.652** 10.200*** 
 
(3.462) (3.303) 
All cash -0.358 -0.527 
 
(1.011) (1.053) 
All stock -7.070 -6.870 
 
(6.283) (6.450) 
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Diversifying -0.659 -0.867 
 
(1.023) (0.898) 
Tender offer -8.626* -9.255* 
 
(4.418) (4.748) 
Relative size 4.893** 4.826** 
 
(2.235) (2.329) 
Private target -1.576 -1.787 
 
(2.879) (2.919) 
Subsidiary target -0.633 -0.811 
 
(3.359) (3.369) 
Constant -103.615** -96.642** 
 
(45.184) (44.367) 
   Target country fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 224 224 
Adjusted R-squared 0.008 0.014 
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Table 4. Regressions of cumulative abnormal returns. 
Panel A show results from OLS regressions over the period 1996-2013. We add two other 
independent variables in column 3 and 4 in Panel A. An indicator variable equal to one if the 
deal is an inversion deal (Inversion), and zero otherwise. Furthermore, we interact our central 
government debt variable with the inversion indicator (GOVDEBT-1*Inversion). The 
dependent variables represent cumulative abnormal returns (CAR and MAR) for acquirers 
over the period t= -1 to t= +1 around the announcement day. CAR(-1; 1) is the cumulative 
abnormal return (in percentage points) of the acquirer from one day before to one day after 
the deal announcement date (day 0), where daily abnormal stock returns are computed using 
the market model and the CRSP value-weighted market returns, with the estimation window 
being days (-200, -60) prior to the deal announcement date (Chen, Harford, and Li (2007)). 
MAR(-1; 1) is the cumulative abnormal return (in percentage points) of the acquirer from one 
day before to one day after the deal announcement date (day 0), where daily abnormal stock 
return is calculated by subtracting the CRSP value-weighted market return from the stock 
return of the acquirer. All returns for U.S. firms are obtained from CRSP. Independent 
variables are computed as differences between the acquirer country (U.S.) and the target 
country. Column 1 in Panel B shows first-stage results of 2SLS regressions using GOVDEBT-
1 as the dependent variable. Column 2 and 3 present results from 2SLS regressions of 
cumulative abnormal returns for acquirers in cross-border acquisitions over the period 1996-
2013. To address endogeneity concerns, we instrument the central government debt variable 
(GOVDEBT-1) using the central government debt in the five fiscal years and the sum of 
public social expenditures (PUBEXPEND-2) in two fiscal years before the deal 
announcement year. We report adjusted R2 that account for degrees of freedom in the 2SLS 
regressions. The Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions assesses the joint null hypothesis 
that the instruments (IVs) are valid instruments, or uncorrelated with the error term, and that 
the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. Under the null, 
the test statistic is distributed as chi-squared (χ2) in the number of overidentifying 
restrictions. A rejection casts doubt on the validity of the instruments. The first-stage F 
statistic is Angrist-Pischke’ s (AP) diagnostic for whether a particular endogenous regressor is 
weakly identified (critical values for the p-values from Stock and Yogo, 2005). Detailed 
definitions of all variables are found in Appendix A. We include target country, acquirer 
industry and year fixed effects (not shown) in all regressions and cluster standard errors by 
target country. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * , ** , 
***  indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Panel A  
 
1 2 3 4 
  CAR (-1;1) MAR (-1;1) CAR (-1;1) MAR (-1;1) 
     GOVDEBT-1 0.046*** 0.043*** 0.045*** 0.042*** 
 
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) 
GOVDEBT-1*Inversion 
  
0.418*** 0.410*** 
   
(0.048) (0.050) 
Inversion 
  
6.610*** 6.921*** 
   
(0.818) (0.740) 
Tax -0.144 -0.093 -0.141 -0.089 
 
(0.090) (0.095) (0.091) (0.095) 
Market MTB -1.018* -0.985 -1.031* -0.999 
 
(0.572) (0.599) (0.572) (0.599) 
Market R12 -0.013 -0.009 -0.013 -0.009 
 
(0.015) (0.013) (0.015) (0.013) 
Kaufman 3.754* 4.143* 3.727* 4.123* 
 
(1.971) (2.028) (1.975) (2.034) 
GDP per capita 7.637* 7.578 7.538* 7.508 
 
(4.273) (4.763) (4.272) (4.762) 
GDP growth 0.066 0.030 0.068 0.031 
 
(0.107) (0.102) (0.107) (0.103) 
Bilateral trade -11.320 -7.213 -11.828 -7.789 
 
(18.737) (17.558) (18.586) (17.464) 
Firm size -0.152* -0.155** -0.153* -0.156** 
 
(0.078) (0.063) (0.078) (0.064) 
ROA -3.279 -3.345 -3.252 -3.320 
 
(2.515) (2.433) (2.521) (2.440) 
MTB 0.029 0.027 0.030 0.028 
 
(0.020) (0.023) (0.020) (0.022) 
Leverage 0.471 0.684 0.504 0.717 
 
(0.729) (0.687) (0.736) (0.695) 
Past return -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 
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(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Top5 institutions -2.328 -2.106 -2.404 -2.181 
 
(1.453) (1.553) (1.459) (1.560) 
All cash 0.047 -0.058 0.054 -0.050 
 
(0.282) (0.309) (0.281) (0.308) 
All stock -1.497 -1.441 -1.491 -1.431 
 
(1.161) (0.966) (1.159) (0.966) 
Diversifying -0.589** -0.666*** -0.591** -0.667*** 
 
(0.230) (0.217) (0.231) (0.217) 
Tender offer 0.955* 1.296** 0.936 1.285** 
 
(0.543) (0.567) (0.549) (0.575) 
Relative size 0.926* 0.924* 0.909* 0.904* 
 
(0.471) (0.483) (0.471) (0.482) 
Private target 1.320* 1.481** 1.309* 1.478** 
 
(0.644) (0.626) (0.658) (0.642) 
Subsidiary target 1.795** 2.054** 1.770** 2.037** 
 
(0.802) (0.776) (0.817) (0.794) 
Constant -1.621 1.178 -1.594 1.196 
 
(2.747) (2.738) (2.729) (2.723) 
     Target country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,884 1,884 1,884 1,884 
Adjusted R-squared 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.007 
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Panel B  
  
1 
1st Stage 
2 
2nd Stage 
3 
2nd Stage 
  GOVDEBT-1 CAR (-1;1) MAR (-1;1) 
    PUBEXPEND-2 4.320** 
  
 
(1.822) 
  GOVDEBT-5 0.659*** 
  
 
(0.078) 
  GOVDEBT-1 
 
0.057*** 0.058*** 
  
(0.020) (0.019) 
Tax -0.412 -0.109 -0.049 
 
(0.798) (0.108) (0.108) 
Market MTB -5.988*** -0.528 -0.385 
 
(1.426) (0.450) (0.486) 
Market R12 0.133** -0.028*** -0.024** 
 
(0.049) (0.010) (0.010) 
Kaufman -23.772** 3.393* 3.726* 
 
(10.802) (1.846) (1.954) 
GDP per capita -64.899** 3.116 3.272 
 
(27.916) (3.720) (3.754) 
GDP growth -0.337 0.027 -0.017 
 
(0.430) (0.082) (0.086) 
Bilateral trade -2.851 -8.142 -3.365 
 
(105.081) (22.522) (21.984) 
Firm size 0.011 -0.134* -0.147** 
 
(0.110) (0.073) (0.069) 
ROA -2.981** -2.881 -2.917 
 
(1.258) (2.245) (2.130) 
MTB 0.014 0.047** 0.041* 
 
(0.035) (0.020) (0.022) 
Leverage -1.691** 0.386 0.698 
 
(0.657) (0.724) (0.718) 
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Past return 0.002 0.000 0.002 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Top5 institutions -0.814 -1.524 -1.333 
 
(1.096) (1.708) (1.742) 
All cash -0.149 0.035 -0.046 
 
(0.227) (0.245) (0.256) 
All stock 0.395 -1.647 -1.499 
 
(0.518) (1.297) (1.079) 
Diversifying 0.059 -0.623*** -0.709*** 
 
(0.218) (0.231) (0.223) 
Tender offer 0.884 1.558** 1.971*** 
 
(0.819) (0.692) (0.704) 
Relative size -0.179 0.991** 0.959** 
 
(0.296) (0.398) (0.417) 
Private target 1.221 1.498** 1.626** 
 
(0.900) (0.697) (0.648) 
Subsidiary target 0.838 2.076** 2.310*** 
 
(0.802) (0.929) (0.874) 
Constant 41.476* 
  
 
(22.680) 
  
    Target country fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,849 1775 1775 
Adjusted R-squared 0.942 0.082 0.083 
1st stage F-statistic (p-value) 0 0 
Hansen J-statistic (χ2) 
 
0.234 0.05 
p-value  0.629 0.823 
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Table 5. Regressions of various tax avoidance measures. 
The table shows regression results using various tax avoidance measures for the three years 
after deal completion. Columns 1-3 show results from OLS regressions and  columns 4-6 
show results from 2SLS regressions are over the period 1996-2013. Country level variables 
are computed as differences between the acquirer country (U.S.) and the target country. To 
address endogeneity concerns, we instrument the central government debt variable 
(GOVDEBT-1) using the central government debt in the five fiscal years and the sum of 
public social expenditures (PUBEXPEND-2) in two fiscal years before the deal 
announcement year. Detailed definitions of all variables are found in Appendix A. We include 
target country, acquirer industry and year fixed effects (not shown) in all regressions and 
cluster standard errors by target country. Additional details on regression diagnostics are as 
described for Table 4. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * 
, ** , ***  indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  
1 
OLS 
2 
OLS 
3 
OLS 
4 
2nd Stage 
5 
2nd Stage 
6 
2nd Stage 
  ΔCTXD3 ΔCTXD/AT3 ΔETRDIFF3 ΔCTXD3 ΔCTXD/AT3 ΔETRDIFF3 
       GOVDEBT-1 -1.590* -0.016* 0.048 -3.215** -0.030*** 0.105* 
 
(0.880) (0.008) (0.041) (1.283) (0.011) (0.059) 
Tax 6.493 -0.050 0.155 11.163 -0.009 0.119 
 
(7.311) (0.054) (0.327) (8.167) (0.046) (0.304) 
ΔCTXD-3 0.155** 
  
0.172*** 
  
 
(0.072) 
  
(0.061) 
  ΔCTXD/AT-3 
 
-0.318*** 
  
-0.316*** 
 
  
(0.069) 
  
(0.075) 
 ΔETRDIFF-3 
  
-0.718*** 
  
-0.700*** 
   
(0.045) 
  
(0.054) 
Market MTB 2.341 -0.039 -0.642 -9.961 -0.396** -0.982 
 
(25.010) (0.225) (0.938) (26.867) (0.192) (0.839) 
Market R12 0.229 0.003 -0.003 0.440 0.007 -0.008 
 
(0.838) (0.006) (0.022) (0.757) (0.007) (0.022) 
Kaufman -91.216 -0.455 5.055 -178.912 -0.721 8.561** 
 
(118.690) (1.053) (3.686) (119.879) (1.096) (4.212) 
GDP per capita -577.799*** -1.197 -9.682 -706.575*** -0.939 -0.355 
 
(201.863) (2.086) (9.458) (246.503) (1.889) (12.932) 
GDP growth -0.330 -0.005 -0.272 1.748 -0.003 -0.293 
 
(7.572) (0.072) (0.263) (7.347) (0.062) (0.188) 
Bilateral trade -3,867.550*** -7.133 -25.448 -3,086.668*** -2.688 -25.380 
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(1,188.620) (9.381) (32.162) (1,151.144) (10.900) (48.163) 
Firm size 36.998*** -0.073* 0.875** 35.558*** -0.057 0.998*** 
 
(8.257) (0.040) (0.315) (7.061) (0.037) (0.323) 
ROA 29.372 4.560*** 14.329** 19.296 4.421*** 13.186** 
 
(61.038) (0.684) (5.723) (57.078) (0.707) (5.273) 
MTB 2.642 0.136*** -0.044 2.108 0.159*** 0.052 
 
(1.605) (0.037) (0.104) (1.607) (0.039) (0.117) 
Leverage -80.249 -2.059*** 1.289 -51.137 -2.389*** 0.737 
 
(68.277) (0.362) (1.185) (51.676) (0.303) (1.102) 
Past return -0.048 0.001 0.000 -0.019 0.002 0.003 
 
(0.088) (0.002) (0.004) (0.083) (0.002) (0.004) 
Top5 institutions -106.265** 0.904 6.080 -115.724*** 1.426 7.453 
 
(40.239) (1.643) (5.332) (37.257) (1.554) (5.359) 
All cash -37.136*** 0.098 -0.469 -37.699*** 0.156 -0.262 
 
(12.722) (0.145) (0.552) (12.095) (0.119) (0.508) 
All stock 29.579 -0.348 -4.278* 19.222 -0.211 -3.172* 
 
(38.120) (0.418) (2.206) (30.969) (0.474) (1.870) 
Diversifying 11.287 -0.444** -1.354 6.904 -0.494*** -1.495* 
 
(9.251) (0.192) (0.916) (9.699) (0.163) (0.884) 
Tender offer 69.535** 0.146 -0.490 70.879** 0.098 -0.398 
 
(32.721) (0.312) (1.415) (34.759) (0.325) (1.246) 
Relative size 17.680* -0.066 -4.448* 19.859*** -0.025 -4.133** 
 
(8.812) (0.308) (2.211) (6.970) (0.315) (2.054) 
Private target 51.113* -0.038 -2.769* 55.332** -0.008 -2.246* 
 
(29.597) (0.262) (1.410) (23.754) (0.260) (1.208) 
Subsidiary target 44.437 0.087 -2.003 53.924** 0.123 -1.636 
 
(29.290) (0.291) (1.389) (22.841) (0.276) (1.227) 
Constant -171.007 1.419 -8.423* 
   
 
(126.564) (0.979) (4.842) 
          Target country 
fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,242 1,242 1,058 1,169 1,169 994 
Adjusted R- 0.256 0.148 0.471   0.506 
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squared 0.361 0.243 
1st stage F-
statistic (p-value)       
0 0 
0 
Hansen J-statistic 
(χ2)       
0.214 0.659 
0.003 
p-value       0.644 0.417 0.958 
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Table 6. Cross-sectional determinants of cross-border acquisitions. 
The table shows estimates from cross-sectional regressions of cross-border acquisitions by 
country pairs over the period 1996-2013. The dependent variable is the cross-border ratio – 
the total number of cross-border acquisitions between 1996 and 2013 in which the acquirer is 
from the U.S. and the target is from an OECD country, as a proportion of all majority and 
cross-border acquisitions in a target country during the period. All country level variables are 
computed as differences between the acquirer country (U.S.) and the target country. Detailed 
definitions of all variables are found in Appendix A. To address endogeneity concerns, we 
instrument the central government debt variable (GOVDEBT-1) using the central government 
debt as a percentage of GDP in the previous five fiscal years and the sum of public social 
expenditures in the previous two fiscal years (PUBEXPEND-2). Column 1 shows first-stage 
results of 2SLS regressions using GOVDEBT-1 as dependent variable. Column 2 shows 
results from OLS regressions. Column 3 shows results from 2SLS regressions. We include 
year fixed effects (not shown) and cluster standard errors by target country. 
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. * , ** , *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
  1 2 3 
 
1st Stage OLS 2nd Stage 
 
GOVDEBT-1 Cross-border flow Cross-border flow 
       
GOVDEBT-1 
 
0.092** 0.099** 
  
(0.038) (0.040) 
PUBEXPEND-2 1.000** 
  
 
(0.410) 
  GOVDEBT-5 0.857*** 
  
 
(0.067) 
  GDP growth -1.209** 0.453 0.576** 
 
(0.542) (0.274) (0.273) 
Tax-1 -0.639 0.271 0.251 
 
(0.735) (0.624) (0.611) 
Market MTB -5.509** 2.629* 2.228* 
 
(2.164) (1.349) (1.315) 
Kaufman -2.491 0.851 1.001 
 
(4.363) (2.609) (2.558) 
GDP per capita -9.654 -6.385 -7.817 
 
(9.532) (5.631) (6.177) 
Market R12 0.153** 0.008 0.015 
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(0.058) (0.027) (0.023) 
Bilateral trade -166.964*** 16.200 16.369 
 
(45.163) (34.474) (33.507) 
Same Religion 7.423** -2.435 -2.596 
 
(2.823) (2.668) (2.506) 
Same Law 2.801 40.383*** 39.755*** 
 
(4.740) (1.566) (1.406) 
Same language -8.995 -42.284*** -41.876*** 
 
(5.479) (3.159) (3.008) 
Distance -7.701 1.528 2.164 
 
(5.183) (4.316) (4.429) 
Sharing border 30.219* 10.361 11.830 
 
(15.192) (14.045) (14.500) 
Colonial link -3.137 1.426 1.611 
 
(4.662) (3.272) (3.422) 
Constant 77.993 -5.870 
 
 
(46.557) (40.987) 
 
    Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 334 345 334 
Adjusted R-squared 0.9 0.462 0.487 
1st stage F-statistic (p-value) 
  
0 
Hansen J-statistic (χ2)  
 
 
0.281 
p-value     0.596 
 
  
 	
	 47	
Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
All cash 
An indicator variable that takes a value of one if the bid 
involves only cash payment to the target shareholders, and zero 
otherwise.  
All stock 
An indicator variable that takes a value of one if the bid 
involves only stock swap with the target shareholders, and zero 
otherwise.  
Bilateral trade 
Maximum of bilateral imports, exports between two countries. 
Bilateral imports (exports) are calculated as the total value of 
imports (exports) by a target's country from an acquirer's 
country as a proportion of total imports by the target's country. 
CAR(-1; 1) 
Cumulative abnormal return (in percentage points) of the 
acquirer from one day before to one day after the deal 
announcement date. Abnormal return is calculated by 
subtracting the CRSP value-weighted market return from the 
stock return of the acquirer.  
Cross-border flow 
The number of cross-border majority acquisitions in which the 
acquirer is from the U.S. and the target is from a non-U.S. 
OECD country in a year, as the percentage of the total number 
of all domestic and cross-border majority acquisitions in that 
target country during that year. 
Diversifying 
An indicator variable that takes a value of one if the acquirer is 
not from the same two-digit SIC industry as the target firm, and 
zero otherwise.  
Firm size 
Natural logarithm of the acquirer’s total assets in constant 2013 
U.S. dollars. 
GDP growth Annual growth in real GDP. 
GDP per capita 
Logarithm of real GDP (current U.S. $) divided by the average 
population. 
GOVDEBT-1 
Central government debt as a percentage of GDP in the year 
before (five years before) the deal announcement year. General 
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government debt-to-GDP ratio is the amount of a country's total 
gross government debt as a percentage of its GDP. It is an 
indicator of an economy's health and a key factor for the 
sustainability of government finance. "Debt" is commonly 
defined as a specific subset of liabilities identified according to 
the types of financial instruments included or excluded. Debt is 
thus obtained as the sum of the following liability categories (as 
applicable): currency and deposits; securities other than shares, 
except financial derivatives; loans; insurance technical reserves; 
and other accounts payable. Changes in government debt over 
time reflect the impact of government deficits. This indicator is 
measured as a percentage of GDP OECD (2016), General 
government debt (indicator). doi: 10.1787/a0528cc2-en 
(Accessed on 16 August 2016). 
GOVDEBT-5 
Central government debt as a percentage of GDP five years 
before the deal announcement year. 
Inversion 
An indicator variable equal to one if the deal is an inversion 
deal (Inversion), and zero otherwise. 
Kaufman 
The average of all six Kaufmann et al. (2009) governance 
indicators: political stability; voice and accountability; 
government effectiveness; regulatory quality; control of 
corruption, and rule of law. Each of the indices ranges from -2.5 
to 2.5, with higher values indicating better governance. 
Leverage 
Book value of debt divided by the sum of book value of debt 
and market value of equity.  
MAR(-1; 1) 
Cumulative abnormal return (in percentage points) of the 
acquirer from one day before to one day after the deal 
announcement date, where daily abnormal stock return is 
calculated by subtracting the CRSP value-weighted market 
return from the stock return of the acquirer. 
Market MTB 
The difference between acquirer (j) and target (i) countries of 
domicile in value-weighted market-to-book equity. 
Market R12 The (average) difference between the annual local real stock 
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market return of the acquirer country (j) and target country (i). 
We obtain total value-weighted return indices in local currency 
for each country. 
Market value The market value of equity.  
MTB Market value of equity divided by book value of equity.  
Past return 
Buy-and-hold stock return (in percentage points) in the year 
prior to deal announcement.  
Private target 
An indicator variable that takes a value of one if the target firm 
is privately held, and zero otherwise.  
PUBEXPEND-2 
Sum of public social expenditures as a percentage of GDP in 
the two years before the deal announcement year 
Relative size The ratio of deal transaction value to the acquirer’s total assets. 
ROA 
Income before extraordinary items scaled by total assets (in 
percentage points).  
Subsidiary target 
An indicator variable that takes a value of one if the target firm 
is a subsidiary, and zero otherwise.  
Tax A country’s statutory corporate income tax rate in percentage. 
Tender offer 
An indicator variable that takes a value of one if the bid is a 
tender offer made to the target shareholders, and zero otherwise.  
Top5 institutions 
The fraction of shares outstanding held by the five largest 
institutional investors prior to deal announcement.  
Total Assets 
The value of the acquirer’s total assets in constant in constant 
2013 U.S. dollars. 
ΔAVOIDANCE3 
The post-deal change in total tax avoidance scaled by the 
acquirer’s total assets, which is the average total tax avoidance 
as a percentage of total assets in the three fiscal years after the 
deal completion minus the total tax avoidance as a percentage 
of total assets in the three fiscal years before the deal 
announcement. 
ΔCTXD/AT3 
The post-deal change in the amount of cash tax paid scaled by 
the acquirer’s total assets, which is the average cash tax paid as 
a percentage of total assets in the three fiscal years after the deal 
completion minus the average cash tax paid as a percentage of 
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total assets in the three fiscal years before the deal 
announcement. 
ΔCTXD3 
Post-deal change in the dollar amount of cash tax paid by the 
acquirer, which is the average amount of cash tax paid in the 
three fiscal years after the deal completion minus the average 
amount of cash tax paid in the three fiscal years before the deal 
announcement. 
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Appendix B: International Tax Competitiveness 
The table shows the results of the 2014 and 2015 International Tax Competitiveness Index 
released by the Tax Foundation. This index measures the competitiveness of tax systems of 
all 34 OECD countries based on five categories: corporate income taxes, individual taxes, 
consumptions taxes, property taxes, and the treatment of foreign earnings. Higher scores and 
lower ranks indicate a more competitive tax system. 
 
Countryname 
Overall Rank 
2014 
Overall Score 
2014 
Overall Rank 
2015 
Overall Score 
2015 
Estonia 1 100 1 100 
New Zealand 2 87.8 2 91.8 
Switzerland 3 82.2 3 84.9 
Sweden 4 79.8 4 83.2 
Australia 5 78.2 7 78.3 
Luxembourg 6 77.1 6 79.1 
Netherlands 7 76.6 5 82 
Slovak Republic 8 74.2 8 76 
Turkey 9 70.3 9 75.5 
Slovenia 10 69.8 18 69.1 
Finland 11 67.4 15 69.8 
Austria 12 67.2 16 69.5 
Norway 13 66.7 12 71 
Korea, Rep. 14 66.4 13 70.9 
Ireland 15 65.7 10 71.6 
Czech Republic 16 64.4 14 69.9 
Denmark 17 63.7 21 65.8 
Hungary 18 63.6 22 65.1 
Mexico 19 63.2 24 61.6 
Germany 20 62.7 17 69.2 
United Kingdom 21 62.2 11 71.5 
Belgium 22 59.6 23 62.5 
Canada 23 59 19 68.7 
Iceland 24 57.2 20 66.5 
Japan 25 54.5 25 61.5 
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Poland 26 53.8 30 55.8 
Greece 27 53.4 27 59.4 
Israel 28 53.1 26 60.8 
Chile 29 51 28 56.8 
Spain 30 50.8 29 56 
Italy 31 47.1 33 50.9 
United States 32 44.3 32 52.9 
Portugal 33 42.9 31 53.1 
France 34 38.9 34 43.7 
 
 
